
My book, Build or Die: How America Is Suffocating Its Cities and What to Do About It, will be published by Princeton University Press on December 8, 2026. Here’s what people are saying:
“Ned Resnikoff has written the authoritative guide to the big decisions that have shaped the American city in the twenty-first century, from housing to transportation to public safety. This is essential reading for those who wish to make the city all it can be.”—Henry Grabar, author of Paved Paradise: How Parking Explains the World
“This is a bracing diagnosis of the housing crisis from one of the best qualified housing journalists of our time.”—Jerusalem Demsas, editor-in-chief of The Argument
“Build or Die is destined to be a classic, a book that those who care about making our cities genuine engines of opportunity will continue to reach for in years to come.”—Steven Teles, professor of government and policy, Johns Hopkins University, and senior fellow, Niskanen Center
Hi everyone, apologies for the impromptu month off. Things have gotten busy as we approach the publication date for Build or Die. I’ve been writing a few freelance pieces pegged to the book’s launch, which I will of course share in this space as they appear in print. And I’ve been lining up some book events in cities across the country, largely in partnership with the Roosevelt Institute and your friendly neighborhood YIMBY organizations. I’ll share more detail on tour dates once things are a little more solidified. (I’m actually writing this en route to this year’s YIMBYtown, where I will be among the keynote speakers.)
In the meantime, I wanted to share some belated thoughts on the outcome of the 2026 midterm elections. The big headline is, of course, the devastating rout of GOP members of Congress throughout the United States, including in deep red areas (Mississippi!) where Democratic candidates have not been truly competitive for decades.
But the election also, as one might expect, led to some seismic shifts in power further down the ballot. Democrats won unified control of the governor’s office and the state legislature in no fewer than six states: Nevada, Arizona, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. They broke Republican trifectas in Texas, Georgia, Iowa, Ohio, and New Hampshire.
How Democratic officeholders in these states conduct themselves over the next couple of years will be at least as important to the future of American democracy as anything Democrats in the House and Senate attempt to get done in the twilight of Trump’s reign. Because Trump still holds the veto pen, Democrats on the Hill won’t be able to pass federal democratic reforms of any significance until 2029 at the earliest; most of their work will involve investigating the webs of patronage and criminality that constitute the decaying Trump regime, and, occasionally, inviting the president to further damage his party by vetoing broadly popular legislation. At the state level, though, there’s real legislating to be done.
The number one agenda item for newly empowered Democratic policymakers needs to be instituting small-d democratic reforms that will prevent anything like the MAGA coalition from seizing state or national power in the future. By this, I don’t mean that Democrats should try to permanently lock the Republicans out of government; I don’t think that’s feasible, and, even if it were, functionally eliminating competitive elections isn’t exactly good for the long-term health of the republic. Instead, the point of these reforms should be to ensure that the Republican Party cannot win significant power in its present form—that an authoritarian, white nationalist rump faction cannot remain electorally viable outside of isolated pockets of the country.
At the same time, Democratic lawmakers and governors will need to make demonstrable progress on affordability, to prove that they are effective managers of their state economies and that they are responsive to the pocketbook concerns of their constituents. Doing this and simultaneously reforming state democracies will be a considerable challenge.
Fortunately, good housing policy can both lower housing costs and further state-level democratization goals. How it accomplishes the former goal should be fairly obvious to anyone who reads this newsletter: legalizing the construction of new housing in high-demand parts of the state will help bring down rents and home prices across entire metropolitan areas. How housing policy works as democratization policy, though, may require a little more explanation.
The relationship between population density and partisan affiliation is fairly well-documented in the political science literature; see for example Will Wilkinson’s 2019 report on “The Density Divide” for the Niskanen Institute, which rounds up some of the available evidence. Will’s paper goes through some of the possible reasons for this divide: people with liberal cosmopolitan leanings will more likely self-select into urban living, people who live in urban areas will develop economically progressive views because they are reliant on the provision of complex, high-quality municipal services, and so on. In Build or Die, I emphasize that the experience of living in dense, racially integrated cities forces many residents to become cosmopolitans of some kind or another (or move away, or become cranky, bigoted recluses), because you can’t function very well in those places unless you have some baseline level of tolerance for exposure to people of other races, creeds, countries of origin, and so on.
So if you want to make achieving statewide office impossible for political parties and candidates that don’t share some baseline commitment to cosmopolitan, multiracial democracy, then you probably want to make your states as urban as possible. Which means that, if you want to make this year’s blue revolution in Texas into something more than a fluke, you should probably figure out how to build out cities like Austin, San Antonio and Houston, so that they become ever greater centers of both demographic and political gravity. As a side bonus, further densifying these cities—and upgrading their transportation networks to support that density—will make Texas a more affordable place to live.
Again, the point of doing this isn’t to lock in permanent Democratic rule. Republicans used to be competitive in big cities, and while I’m not here to praise the party of Nelson Rockefeller (which, after all, was also the party of Richard Nixon, Barry Goldwater, and Ronald Reagan), I do think it’s basically inarguable that the midcentury GOP would be a significant improvement over the current model. Which is not to say that we can simply roll back the clock to an earlier GOP; I’m only arguing that a GOP which can gain national power without making inroads into urbanized, cosmopolitan America is a GOP that can gain national power without first expelling the gutter racists in its highest echelons. Newly elected Democrats should do everything they can to ensure that a national party steered by gutter racists will remain nonviable for the foreseeable future.
As strange as it may sound, upzoning and permitting reform can help get us there. The more urbanized America becomes, the stronger our defenses against another MAGA takeover.
P.S.—If you’re a state-level Democratic policymaker and you’re wondering where to start, Nolan Gray of the Metropolitan Abundance Project has put together a comprehensive and extremely helpful ideas roundup.
